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Legislation has prompted changes in milk price volatility.  Milk price volatility impacts the 
producer’s exposure to business risk which is compound by the firms financial risk.  Financial 
risk is a function of the firms capital structure.  In the short run it is difficult for the producer to 
significantly change the firms capital structure and therefore balance increased business risk with 
reduced financial risk.  The producer can however reduce financial and business risk by using 
futures contracts to lock in a price for milk produced.  The producer’s risk preferences dictate the 
producer’s hedge ratio.  Using the return on equity as a profitability measure and the conditional 
value at risk as a risk measure the optimal hedge ratio is derived for various probabilities of 
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Introduction 
 
Legislation has prompted  changes in milk price volatility.  Increased price volatility 
reduces the financial leverage that a producer can adopt.    The risk balancing literature has shown 
that producers compensate for increased business risk by decreasing financial risk (Gabriel and 
Baker, 1980).  Financial risk is directly related to the firm’s capital structure. Furthermore lack of 
access to equity markets make the capital structure for closely held corporations inflexible in the 
short run.  This study will develop strategies the producer can use to balance increased milk price 
risk using futures in the short run. 
A number of different risk measures have been proposed in the literature.  Theoretical 
grounding requires risk measures to rank portfolios in a manner that is consistent with expected 
utility theory.   Direct use of expected utility requires the laborious task of ascertaining cardinal 
knowledge of the decision maker’s utility function.  This has prompted researchers to utilize 
simpler risk efficiency approaches, making only modest assumptions about the utility function to 
calculate an efficient frontier of alternatives based on risk measures.   
One of the more popular risk measures is the standard deviation of returns.  Perhaps the 
most troubling aspect of the standard deviation criterion is that it discriminates against portfolios 
with return distributions that have a highly volatile right tail (Turvey and Nayak, 2003).  In 
reality, volatility in the left tail, the unprofitable portion of the tail, is what really concerns 
decision makers.  Furthermore consistency with expected utility requires decision makers to have 
quadratic utility functions or returns that are normally distributed or return distributions that vary 
only by location and scale and scale parameters (Meyer, 1987).  Quadratic utility functions are 
not theoretically justified because they are not monotonically increasing. When tested empirically 
return distributions are typically distributed log normally, not normally (Kritzman, 1992).  Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  3 
Furthermore the distributions of returns for the options and futures contracts considered in this 
study vary by more than just the location scale transformation defined by Meyer. 
The Value at Risk (VaR) measure of risk was recently introduced and has become 
extremely popular in the credit and finance sector.  VaR predicts with a given confidence level 
that losses will not exceed a threshold level within a given time period (Hull, 1997, 22).  VaR 
attempts to quantify in a holistic sense all of the risks facing a firm in a single number.  Despite 
the intuitive appeal of the VaR risk measure, models that use VaR suffer from theoretical 
shortcomings.  The most notable of which is the possibility that portfolio diversification will 
increase risk (Plug, 2000).  This violation of the sub additivity occurs when the VaR of the 
portfolio is greater than the sum of the VaRs for each individual asset.  The result of this violation 
is a risk function that is not necessary globally convex with respect to diversification, making 
optimization with linear programming difficult (Uryasev, 2000).     
Given that losses exceed VaR the expected loss is called the conditional Value at Risk 
(cVaR) (Tyrell and Uryasev, 2002).  Unlike VaR, the cVaR risk measure is sub additive axiom 
and is a globally convex function with respect to portfolio diversification (Plug, 2000).   The sub 
additive attribute of the cVaR risk measure enables consistency to be established with expected 
utility when portfolios are ranked using second order stochastic dominance, consistency under the 
VaR risk measure requires the additional assumption that the loss distribution has a normal 
distribution or the more stringent condition that the portfolios are ranked by first degree stochastic 
dominance (Yoshiba, 2001).  First degree stochastic dominance has limited discriminatory power 
(Anderson, et al., 1977, 284) and the returns typically do not have normal distributions. They 
have returns that log normally distributed.  Furthermore the globally convex nature of the cVaR 
function makes even large problems with many scenarios easy to optimize using linear 
programming software.   Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  4 
The total risk is the sum of both business and financial risk.  Dairy producers face a 
number of different sources of business risk such as production risk or the risk of volatile 
production and price risk or the risk of volatile prices (Harwood, 1999).  Financial risk is a 
function of business risk and refers to the increase in total risk due to the decision maker’s 
selection of capital structure (Collins, 1985).   
The management objectives of individual dairy producers dictate the optimal distribution 
of return on equity (ROE) for an individual dairy producer.  The distribution of ROE is affected 
by the capital structure and business risk facing the producer.  The risk balancing hypothesis 
explains the decrease in financial risk that takes place when business risk increases (Gabriel and 
Baker, 1980).  Legislation frequently changes the business risk facing dairy producers thereby 
affecting the distribution of ROE.  In the short run the capital structure of closely held family 
corporations and proprietorships is relatively inflexible because efficient equity markets do not 
exist.  Therefore it is difficult for producers to balance increases in business risk with decreased 
financial risk in the short run.  The cVaR risk measure is applied to the distribution of ROE for 
dairy producers.  Futures on class III milk are included as a decision variable in the model.   The 
linear program calculates the appropriate values for the decision variables maximizing ROE and 
molding the short run distribution of ROE subject to balancing constraints.  Furthermore the 
constraints can be adjusted to enable the producer to mold the distribution in the short run to meet 
specific survival and profit maximization management goals. 
Agricultural risk management has been thoroughly researched by agricultural economists.  
Recently several applications of  VaR to agricultural operations have been documented in the 
economic literature.  The application of cVaR to the dairy industry is sure to stimulate discussion 
on the feasibility of hedging formula prices based on the weighted average prices for four classes 
using futures and options on class III milk.Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  5 
Business and Financial Risk 
The profitability of a firm is frequently analyzed using ratios.  One of the ratios that is 
typically used is the return on equity (ROE).  The firm’s monthly ROE can be calculated as 
(0.1) 
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P  is a stochastic variables that quantifies the distributions of the expected class I milk 
price per hundredweight and Q is a deterministic parameter identifying the quantity of 
hundredweights expected for a given month respectively.    The cost of feed per hundredweight, 
fixed costs, interest rate, debt and equity are captured by the parameters F, K, i, D and E 
respectively. 
  A second ratio that is frequently used is the firm’s return on assets (ROA).  The monthly 










where the numerator is the same as equation (0.1) except that interest costs are not included and 
the denominator is equal to the firm’s assets instead of the firm’s equity. 
  The relationship between the firm’s ROE and ROA is defined by the duPont identity which 
states that  
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Frequently a risk operator ρ  is applied to the firm’s distribution of ROA to determine the firm’s 
business risk exposure.  For Florida dairy producers variability in ROA is a function of volatile 
prices and production.  For dairy producers price volatility is a function of government programs 
such as the federally mandated milk price support program.  Production volatility is a function of Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  6 
weather and facilities.  Similarly a risk operator ρ  can be applied to the distribution of ROE to 
determine the firm’s total risk exposure.  The difference between ρ (ROE) and ρ (ROA) reflects the 




, the capital structure multiplier in 
equation (0.3).  In this study it is assumed that the firm’s interest rate i is deterministic and not a 
function of the firm’s capital structure.  This is an assumption, which is not consistent with 
financial theory but is consistent with the lending practices of many agricultural lenders. 
Risk Balancing 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that in perfect capital markets a firm’s capital 
structure is irrelevant (Modigliani and Miller, 1958).  However, in the real world market 
imperfections exist.  In the United States interest is a deductible expense and therefore a tax 
shield.  Modigliani and Miller (1963) showed that with the introduction of the corporate income 
tax the optimal capital structure is the capital structure that maximizes the present value of the tax 
shield and therefore the debt to equity ratio(Modigliani and Miller, 1963).  Warner showed that 
bankruptcy costs were significant (Warner, 1977).  As the debt to equity ratio increase so does the 
probability of bankruptcy.  As residual stakeholders, the firm’s equity holders primarily bare the 
costs of bankruptcy.  This reduces the debt to equity ratio.  The debate could continue.  In the real 
world there is more variation in the capital structures of industries than there is in capital 
structures of firms in a particular industry.  This fact alone suggests that an optimal capital 
structure does exist.  Furthermore in general less debt is carried by industries that are in 
considered “risky” than by industries that are considered “less risky.” This seems to reaffirm 
Gabriel and Baker’s risk balancing hypothesis.  The risk balancing hypothesis claims that a 
decline in business risk produces an increase in financial risk (Gabriel and Baker, 1980).  Most of 
the research done on optimal debt can be found in the corporate finance literature.  Agricultural Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  7 
firms such as dairies, are either held as proprietorships, partnerships or closely held corporations 
and therefore do not have access to efficient equity markets.  This results in short term 
inflexibility of the agricultural firms debt to equity ratio and differentiates it from large publicly 
traded corporations.  Therefore in the short run it is difficult for agricultural firms to alter their 
capital structure in response to changing levels of business risk. 
Milk Marketing 
The 1996 Farm Bill ushered in a new era for agricultural producers.  Amid concerns of a 
growing national debt and deficit, Congress sought ways to reduce spending on costly farm 
programs such as price supports.  The Bill required government to distance itself from direct 
intervention in the agricultural arena.  For dairy producers this meant the gradual elimination of 
milk price supports.  The 2002 Farm Bill reauthorized price supports.  In addition Congress 
included the Milk Income Loss Contract Program, which compensated producers 45% of the 
difference between $16.94 per hundredweight and the Boston class I price.  While the 1996 Farm 
Bill signaled a transition to a free market the 2002 Farm Bill reinstated programs and invented 
programs that were reminiscent of a more protectionist era.   
  Currently the price support for milk is maintained through government purchases of 
butter, non-fat dry milk (NFDM) and block or barrel cheese.  Purchases of supported dairy 
products are intended to support the price of milk at $9.90 per hundredweight.  While the milk 
support price has remained constant over the past few years the price of underlying supported 
commodities has not.  The Secretary of Agriculture is charged with maintaining an effective 
support price of $9.90 per hundredweight for producers.  Twice a year the Secretary reviews the 
prices of the underlying supported manufactured dairy products.  The Secretary will change  the 
relationship of support prices for manufactured dairy products, maintaining the mandated price 
floor, if it is determined that public expenditures on the dairy price support program can be Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  8 
reduced.  This adjustment is called the butter powder tilt.  Two such adjustments have been made 
since January 2001.  On January 16, 2001 the Secretary dropped the support price of NFDM from 
$1.00 to $.90 per pound while simultaneously increasing the butter support price from $.65 to 
$.85 per pound.  These adjustments maintained a $9.90 milk price support.  The government 
continued to accumulate NFDM well above its ability to use the product.  From October 2000 to 
May 2001 the Commodity Credit Corporation purchased 330 million pounds of NFDM.  This 
represented over 40% of the NFDM produced during that time period.  On June 1, 2001 the 
Secretary revaluated the support price for butter and NFDM.  The NFDM price was decreased to 
$.80 per pound and the butter price was increased to $1.05 per pound.  These adjustments yielded 
a support price of $9.90 per hundredweight as mandated. 
  The $9.90 per hundredweight support price is based on milk with 3.67% butterfat.  This 
translates into roughly $9.80 per hundredweight on a 3.5% butterfat basis.  Adjustments can be 
made using the butterfat differential, which is currently not reported.  The price adjustment for 
3.67% butterfat to 3.5% butterfat milk can be calculated by subtracting .17 times the price of 
butterfat and adding .17 times the price of skim.  The support price is maintained through 
government purchases of storable commodities such as non-fat dry milk, butter and cheese.  
There is however no mandate for plants to sell to the government therefore in real terms the price 
producers receive for delivered milk can drop below $9.80 hundredweight.  Currently plants are 
reluctant to sell at support prices when opportunities exist in the private sector.  Plants put a 
premium on selling milk to the private sector because the government requires special packaging 
and grading.  Packaging and grading fees increase the cost of selling manufactured dairy products 
to the government.  This has resulted in class prices that are well below support prices. 
The federal price support program operates independently from the Federal Milk 
Marketing Order System (FMMO).  The FMMO administers formulas, which are used to set Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  9 
minimum class prices which are published based on 3.5% butterfat.  The class III price is the 
minimum price processors manufacturing cheese are able to purchase raw milk at.  The class IV 
price is the minimum price that butter and NFDM processors  are able to purchase raw milk.  
Prices are calculated based on formulas. The formulas are based on component prices which are 
estimated using wholesale survey prices of cheese, non fat dry milk, butter and  dried whey for a 
given period.   Class I and class II milk is used for fluid milk and frozen dairy products 
respectively.   The class I price is based on the maximum of the class III and class four formula 
prices plus a fixed locational differential.  While the class I component prices are calculated using 
the same formula the survey period of wholesale dairy products differs.  This intricacy is 
important because it complicates hedging attempts by producers in predominantly class I markets. 
Changing government policies, butter powder tilts and current market conditions impact 
the business risk facing dairy producers.  The price volatility for each of the four milk classes can 
be evaluated using historical class data.  The price volatility σ  is a measure of the milk price 
uncertainty.  First the standard deviation of the natural logs of successive monthly milk prices is 
taken for each year.  The result is multiplied by the square root of 12 to generate an annualized 
estimate of price volatility σ .  Monthly class I price mover data from 1996 to 2002 were used to 
calculate the yearly estimates of σ   presented in Table 1.  The second column of Table 1 reports 
the estimated yearly estimates of σ .  The remaining column report the F statistic used to test the 
null hypothesis that the σ  from succeeding years were equal.  F statistics greater than 3.47 
indicate an attained significance level α  of .05 or less.  The attained significance level refers to 
the probability of type I error or the error that occurs when the null hypothesis is rejected when in 
fact the null hypothesis is true.  Considering only the off diagonal it can be seen that the price 
volatility varied significantly from 1996-1997, 1998-1999,1999-2000 and 2001 to 2002. Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  10 
Table 1.  Annualized Standard Deviation of Monthly Class I Mover Price Returns and F Values to Test Yearly 
Differences in Annualized Standard Deviations 
 
 
The results illustrated statistically in Table 1 can be seen graphically in Figure 1.  In Table 
1 the lowest σ  is 7.22% and is reported for 2002.  This corresponds to a period of prices that 









































Figure 1.  Class I Mover January 1996 to December 2002 
Problem Statement 
The Dairy Business Analysis Project (DBAP) was initiated in 1996 by the University of 
Florida to survey the financial performance of Florida dairy producers.  DBAP summarizes the 
Year Annualized S.D.  (σ )
1996 12.32%  *5.012
1997 27.57%  1.075
1998 26.60%  *6.197
1999 66.21%  *31.299
2000 11.84%  *10.984
2001 39.23%  *29.536
2002 7.22%Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  11 
financial information of several categories of dairy producers.  The information provided here is 
based on the 13 most profitable dairies (measured by ROA) in 2001.  
Using per hundredweight revenue and cost estimates an income statement was formed.  A 
balance sheet was also constructed based on DBAP estimates of assets and liabilities per cow.  
Using the net income calculated from the income statement and the equity calculated from the 
balance sheet the ROE was compared for various capital structures.  Figure 2 illustrates the 


































Figure 2.  Comparison of Return on Equity (ROE) for 0% and 50% debt. 
 
When prices equal $11.63 the profitability of the levered dairy  equals the profitability of 
the unlevered dairy.  The dairy producer is indifferent between these two capital structures when 
prices remain at this level.  As prices increase the profitability increases quicker for the levered 
firm than for the unlevered firm.  Similarly as prices fall the profitability of the prices for the 
levered firm decreases quicker than the profitability of the unlevered firm.  If prices drop below 
$11.22 the levered firm will no longer cash flows.  Prices need drop to $10.82 in order for the 
unlevered firm to no longer cash flow.  The slop and intercept of the ROE for the unlevered firm Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  12 
are a function of the firm’s business risk.  The rightward shift of the intercept and increased slope 
of ROE for the levered firm are a function of the firm’s financial risk. 
The problem facing producers using leverage is that increased price volatility increases the 
probability of dropping below the $11.22 threshhold milk price.  The risk balancing hypothesis 
suggests that the producer reduce financial risk in response to increased business risk.  However 
in the short run closely held firms have a relatively inflexible capital structure.  Increasing price 
volatility reduces the amount of debt that a dairy farm can carry.  This study will analyze the 
impact of using class III milk futures contracts to mitigate the short run changes in price 
volatility. 
Risk Measures 
A number of different risk measures have been utilized in the academic risk management 
literature.  Different criteria have been proposed to evaluate the legitimacy of these risk measures.  
One of the criteria that is frequently cited is consistency with expected utility.  Consistency with 
expected utility requires that portfolios ranked by the risk measure have the same ordinal ranking 
as portfolios ranked by expected utility.  Expected utility is based on the von Neumann 
Morgenstern axiomatic proof.  Choice under uncertainty requires the independence axiom.  The 
axiom of independence assumes that the rational choice between two portfolios should be based 
on how they differ.    Several studies have shown the independence axiom to be violated 
empirically, however despite its shortcomings, expected utility remains the theoretically superior 
model for describing choice under uncertainty. 
The standard deviation is a risk measure that is frequently used in the academic literature.  
The standard deviation is consistent with expected utility under the following three conditions.  
When the underlying utility function is quadratic, the return distribution is normally distributed or 
when the choice set consists of variables that differ by a location scale transformation then Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  13 
consistency with expected utility is achieved.   The first condition poses serious theoretical 
shortcomings because quadratic utility functions are not monotonically increasing.  The second 
condition is not supported empirically as return distributions are typically normally distributed. 
A second risk measure that has recently become popular in the credit and finance industry 
is the value at risk (VaR).  The VaR determines the probability of a portfolio losing a given 
amount in a given time period due to averse market conditions with a particular confidence level.  
According to Yoshiba and Yamai, VaR is consistent with expected utility maximization when the 
cumulative distribution of returns for portfolios can be ranked using first-degree stochastic 
dominance.  According to Guthoff, Pfingsten and Wolf, the more lenient condition of consistency 
with second order stochastic dominance is all that is required when the returns have an elliptical 
distribution (Guthoff, January 1997). 
Conditional value at risk (cVaR) is the expected value of losses given that losses exceed 
VaR.  The conditional value at risk is consistent with expected utility under more lenient 
conditions than VaR because consistency with expected utility can be achieved when portfolios 
are ranked using second degree stochastic dominance with no distributional assumptions. 
A second criteria for ranking risk measures is coherency.  Artsner proposes a four 
properties for coherency.  He defines a coherent risk measure as a risk measure that is sub 
additive, positively homogenous, monotonic with respect to first degree stochastic dominance, 
and translation invariance (Artzner). 
The property of subadditivity requires that mergers not create extra risk.  Therefore when 
the risk measure ρ  is applied individually to the returns from two assets, x1 and x2, the combined 
risk must be less than or equal to the risk of the two assets.  Mathematically Artzner represents 
this as  
(0.4)  12 1 2 () ( ) ( ) x xx x ρρ ρ +≤ + , Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  14 
where ρ  is the risk measure operator.   The property of subadditivity is limited by the property of 
positive homogeneity when there is there is no diversification effect.  For example if the position 
is doubled for asset x1 then there is no diversification effect and  
(0.5)  11 () ( ) x x ρλ λ ρ= . 
The property of monotonicity assumes that if the losses of x1 are less than the losses of x2 for 
every scenario then ρ (x1) must be less than or equal to ρ (x2).  The translation invariance axiom 
assumes that the addition of a constant deterministic variable κ  affects the level of risk by the 
value of that constant such that  
(0.6)  11 () ( ) xx ρ κ ρ κ += + . 
Several of the risk measures considered in the literature are not coherent.  The standard 
deviation violates the property of monotonicity with respect to first degree stochastic dominance 
in some cases.   The standard deviation is monotonic with respect to first degree stochastic 
dominance when returns are normally distributed, however as previously discussed empirical 
evidence suggests that returns are not typically normally distributed.  Value at risk is not a 
coherent risk measure because it violates the property of subadditivity when returns are not 
normally distributed (Plug, 2000).  Conditional value at risk satisfies the subadditivity property 
with out making any distributional assumptions.   Furthermore cVaR is positively homogenous, 
translation invariant and monotonic with respect to first-degree stochastic dominance and 
therefore coherent.  
The weaker assumptions necessary to achieve consistency with expected utility and 
coherency prompted the selection of the cVaR risk measure for this study.  Mathmatically 
Rockafellar and Uryasev define cVaR for discrete distributions as Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  15 
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where x is the decision variable, θ   is the value at risk, α  is the confidence level and y is a vector 
of stochastic variables (Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2000).  The loss distribution is a function of 
both the decision variable and the stochastic vector and is defined as f(x,y).  For the purposes of 
this study the value at risk will be defined as a critical ROE.  The loss function f(x,y) generates a 
ROE for each particular scenario.  Using equation (0.7) it is possible then to estimate cVaR. 
Dairy Futures 
The class III milk futures have been traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) 
since August of 1997.  Basis defines the difference between the cash price and the futures price at 
a given point in time.  The short hedger who seeks to hedge the sale of product produced for sale 
at some later time effectively trades price risk for basis risk.  Basis risk is the term given to the 
variation in basis at a given time period.  The effective price for the dairy producer trying to 
hedge future class III milk sales equals the entry price on the futures contract plus the basis 
between the local cash market price and the futures price at the time the contract expires.   The 
entry price on the futures is always known however for most agricultural contracts closing basis is 
not known. 
Most hedgers who assume a position on an agricultural futures contract roundturn their 
position by taking an equal and opposite position on the same contract.  This effectively 
eliminates the hedger’s position in the market.  Making delivery on an agricultural futures 
contract for most hedgers is typically too cumbersome.  The class III milk futures contract is 
differentiated from other agricultural futures in that the contract does not require delivery of the 
underlying physical commodity.  The class III milk futures contract, cash settles to the future 
class III price released by the USDA.  Cash settlement greatly simplifies the process of making 
delivery.  As a result, a majority class III of milk hedgers do not offset their obligations on the Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  16 
futures contract by round turning their positions prior to expiration.  Class III milk hedgers make 
“delivery.”  Making delivery on the cash settled class III futures contract ensures that the basis 
between the futures position and cash is zero and therefore for hedgers of class III milk the risk of 
a variable closing basis does not exist.  The hedger of class III milk futures is able to effectively 
















Figure 3.  March 2003 A Comparison of Milk Class Utilization Between Florida and the Upper Midwest  
Milk marketing in the United States is based on a complex system of formulas and 
surveys.  Formulas are used to calculate the price of milk in each of four classes, defined early in 
this paper.  Surveys conducted by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) are used 
estimate the whole sale prices of butter, NFDM, cheese and dried whey.  These estimates are used 
to calculate the class III and class IV milk prices.   Currently futures contracts based on the class 
III and class IV milk utilizations are listed on the CME and in reality only the class III milk  
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contract is traded.  Producers of milk that is used primarily in the class III market are able to 
hedge their milk production without considering basis risk.  Producers from marketing orders 
such as Florida where a nearly 90% of the milk produced is utilized in the class I market do need  
to consider basis risk.   
 
According to Hull three sources of basis risk are (1)  uncertainty as to when the 
commodity will be marketed (2) closing the futures position before its expiration date (3) the 
commodity hedged is not the same as the underlying asset of the futures contract.  Producers in 
the Upper Midwest, where class III milk dominates utilization, do not have to worry about the 
basis risk as much as the Florida producers.  Florida producers face basis risk from two of the 
three sources noted by Hull.  Since most of the milk produced in Florida is utilized in the class I 
market, Florida producers who seek to hedge their milk revenue must determine the feasibility of 
hedging class I sales with a class III futures contract.  The class I milk price is based on the 
maximum of the class III and class IV milk prices and a fixed differential.  The maximum of the 
class III and class IV milk price is called the class I mover.  Effective hedging requires the ability 
to lock in the price of the mover, the stochastic portion of class I milk price.  Some brokers have 
encouraged their clients to hedge with the maximum of the class III or class IV.   Today this 
strategy is not effective because of the limited trading on the class IV futures contract.  In fact at 
the time this article was written, the CME had stopped listing new class IV futures contracts.   
Because of the thinly traded class IV future contract this paper only considered the use of 
the class III contract.  Using the class III futures contract the producer should be able to lock in a 
minimum mover price.  Therefore, at first glance, any basis risk encountered would work to the 
producers favor.  This would be true if class I mover was based on the same survey periods and 
durations as the class III and class IV prices.  In reality the class III and class IV price are  
calculated  based on the NASS surveys during that month.  The class III and class IV prices are Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  18 
released during the first week of the following month. The class I price for a given month is based 
on only first two weeks of NASS surveys from the preceding month.    This exposes Florida 
producers to two of the causes of basis risk described by Hull.  First of all, Florida producers face 
basis risk because they seek to hedge class I milk with a class III futures contract.  This exposes 
producers to basis risk because the underlying asset of the class III is based on a full month of 
NASS surveys and not two weeks worth of NASS surveys like the class I mover.  Furthermore 
the class I price is announced on a different date than the class III and class IV prices.  Therefore 
producers are exposed to basis risk because they must round turn their contracts prior to the 
contracts expiration date.   
This study determines the feasibility of hedging the class one mover for a given month by 
using the class III futures contract with an expiration from the previous month.  The hedge was 
set on the first day of the month ten months prior to the first day of the “delivery” month.  If milk 
futures were not traded on this day then the closest prior day was used. The contract was offset by 
roundturning the same class III futures on the day the class I price was announced.  Using this 
strategy producers were able to lock in a minimum class I mover in all but 2 months from January 
2000 to April 2003.  
Figure 4 illustrates the effectiveness of locking in a minimum class I mover.  On March 
2002 the effective price was $.02 below the class III enter price and on November 2002 the 
effective price was $.05 below the class III futures enter price.  Both of these incidents were 
caused by an accelerating component prices during the NASS survey weeks for February and 
October class III prices and lower prices during the survey period for March and November class 
I futures. Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  19 
Figure 4.  The Class III FuturesEnter Price Versus the Effective Class I Mover From January 2000 to April 
2003 
 
An additional concern for milk hedgers from all marketing orders is the high bid ask 
spread price in the  class III dairy markets.  The spread between the bid ask price can be used as a 
proxy for liquidity.  The spread can also be considered as the cost of liquidity.  Thinly traded 
markets such as dairy are characterized by a wider bid ask spread .  The wider bid ask spread can 
be explained two ways.  First of all, the higher bid ask spread is necessary to compensate market 
makers who have to look harder to find buyers and sellers in thin markets.  Secondly thinner 
markets also have fewer market makers and therefore there is less competition amongst market 
makers.  Market liquidity consists of three non mutually exclusive parts immediacy, size and 
price continuity.  Liquidity is the “ability to transact immediately , in size with little transaction 
induced price changes.  Consider a dairy farm with 1300 hundred cows that produced 50 pounds 
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short position on 10 class III futures contracts.  If the producer tried to lock in the price of March 
2004 milk on May 13, 2003 then the producer would have increased the volume for that day from 
1 to 11!  The far off contracts are thinly traded and therefore if this producer took a short position 
on 10 contracts all on the same day the price would have probably dropped significantly. 
For this study it is assumed that produces are able to lock in the settle price ten months 
prior to the sale of class I milk.  Liquidity concerns in dairy marketing threaten the reality of this 
assumption.   However, this assumption is made for simplicity.  In practice strategies using 
futures strategies using futures recommended in the results section of this paper should be 
implemented with a broker who is knowledgable about the liquidity concerns of trading far off 
milk futures contracts. 
Empirical Model 
 
The Cox-Rubenstein model was used to imply the volatility of class III prices in January 
and August of 2001.  The implied volatility was used to construct a binomial tree which was used 
to the distribution of future class III milk prices.  In this study the binomial distribution used to 
contruct the price tree was approximated with the normal distribution.  Using Monte-Carlo 
simulation paths were randomly sampled through the binomial tree to generate a random sample 
of the possible class I mover.   
The model is based on the most recently available 2001 DBAP data.  Data from the 
thirteen most profitable dairies were used. Using these data estimates were generated for the cost 
of feed, personnel etc on a per hundredweight basis.  The interest rate was estimated to by 7.25%.  
Based on these cost estimates the ROEs were generated for the capital structures ranging from 0% 
debt to 50% debt. The distribution of ROE for each of the capital structures was determined.   
The VaR was set at 0% on the simulated ROE distribution that was based on no debt.   
The cVaR was calculated.  The value for cVaR that was calculated was used to constrain the Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  21 
distributions of ROE from each of the capital structures considered.  Using stochastic linear 
programming the expected ROE was maximized subject to the cVaR constraint.  The hedge ratio, 
the percent of cash sales hedged with class III futures contracts, was included as the only decision 
variable in this model. 
(0.8)  0% () . MaxE ROE sto cVaR  
 The model considered based on the assumption that producers have lexicographic preferences for 
a given level of risk.  Two months were considered January of 2001 and August of 2001.  January 
contract hedged using a December 1999 class III milk futures contract and the August was 
hedged using the July 2001 class III milk futures contract.  The short position on each of these 
contracts was executed on 3/1/2000 and 9/29/2000 respectively. 
Results 
 
The hedge ratio estimates for various capital structures are presented in Table 2.  The estimates 
were determined by maximizing the expected ROE subject to a cVaR constraint.  The cVaR 
constraint was based a VaR of 0%, 5% or 10% and on the cVaR calculated for the dairy with 0% 
debt.   
Based on the results presented in Table 2 it is clear that as the dairy’s financial risk 
increases the increase in financial risk can be offset by a corresponding decrease in business risk 
through hedging.  The direct relationship between the percent debt and the hedge ratio indicates 
that producers are able to use class III milk futures balance financial risk. In order to earn a net 
profit the class III mover must be greater than $10.82 per hundred weight.  The class I mover 
locked in for January was $12.05 and the class I mover locked in for August was $10.89.  The 
lower the difference between the class III entry price and $10.82 the higher the hedge ratio must 
be for a given percent debt based on a cVaR constraint. Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  22 




The model used in this paper used in this paper does not consider closing basis risk that 
producers were exposed too.  Basis risk as illustrated early in this paper can be significant 
although historically variations in basis typically work to the producers advantage.  Liquidity 
concerns are another issue discussed briefly in this paper that were not addressed by this model.  
The prudent hedger should be careful to set large positions over an adequate time in order to 
ensure price continuity.  Furthermore the model only considers the producers ability to hedge the 
class I mover.  In reality the producer needs to focus on hedging payments received by the 
cooperative.  Although cooperative payments should be highly correlated with the class I mover 
this does not have to be the case.  The cooperative is not required to pay minimum class prices to 
producers.  Furthermore the cooperative has its own system of deductions and premiums that 
% Debt cVaR Expected ROE Hedge Ratio VaR % Debt cVaR Expected ROE Hedge Ratio VaR
0% -4.77% 5.57% 0.00% 0% 0% -6.75% -0.32% 0.00% 0%
10% -4.77% 5.38% 11.00% 10% -6.75% -0.34% 14.55%
20% -4.77% 5.14% 21.80% 20% -6.75% -1.31% 29.61%
30% -4.77% 4.83% 32.86% 30% -6.75% -2.56% 44.76%
40% -4.77% 4.42% 44.08% 40% -6.75% -4.23% 60.95%
50% -4.77% 3.85% 54.82% 50% -6.75% -6.59% 84.98%
% Debt cVaR Expected ROE Hedge Ratio VaR % Debt cVaR Expected ROE Hedge Ratio VaR
0% -1.58% 5.58% 0.00% 5% 0% -4.27% 0.44% 0.00% 5%
10% -1.58% 5.38% 10.88% 10% -4.27% -0.34% 15.80%
20% -1.58% 5.14% 22.17% 20% -4.27% -1.31% 32.53%
30% -1.58% 4.83% 33.27% 30% -4.27% -2.57% 51.33%
40% -1.58% 4.42% 44.53% 40% n/a n/a n/a
50% -1.58% 3.85% 55.31% 50% n/a n/a n/a
% Debt cVaR Expected ROE Hedge Ratio VaR % Debt cVaR Expected ROE Hedge Ratio VaR
0% 1.02% 5.58% 0.00% 10% 0% -2.37% 0.44% 0.00% 10%
10% 1.02% 5.38% 11.31% 10% -2.37% -0.34% 18.98%
20% 1.02% 5.14% 22.73% 20% -2.37% -1.33% 41.15%
30% 1.02% 4.83% 34.24% 30% n/a n/a n/a
40% 1.02% 4.42% 46.16% 40% n/a n/a n/a
50% 1.02% 3.84% 58.19% 50% n/a n/a n/a
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have not been accounted for by this study.  Finally production risk due to inclement weather is 
concern for Florida producers.  A worthwhile step would be to construct econometric estimates to 
the variable per hundred weight costs.  Using these estimates in conjunction with estimates of 
production variable would also increase the usefulness of this model.  However despite its 
shortcomings this model shows that theoretically (closing basis risk equals 0) producers paid the 
class I price based on a class III mover are able to reduce financial risk by using class III futures 
contracts and therefore they are able to balance increases in business risk during times of 
increased price uncertainty.Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  24 
Bibliography 
Anderson, J. R., J. L. Dillon, and J. B. Hardaker. Agricultural 
decision analysis. 1st ed. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 
1977. 
Artzner, P. "Coherent Measures of Risk." (1998). 
Collins, R. A. "Expected utility, debt-equity structure, and risk 
balancing." American journal of agricultural economics 67, 
no. 3(1985): 627-629. 
Gabriel, S. C., and C. B. Baker. "Concepts of business and 
financial risk." American journal of agricultural economics 
(1980). 
Guthoff, A., A Pfingsten, and J. Wolf. "On the Compatibility of 
Value at Risk, Other Risk Concepts, and Expected Utility 
Maximization." Diskussionsbeitrag 97-01, Westfalishce 
Wilhelms-Universitat Munster, Institut fur Kreditwesen 
(January 1997). 
Harwood, J. L. Managing Risk in Farming: Concepts, Research, 
and Analysis. Agricultural economic report ; no. 774. 
Washington, DC (1800 M. St., NW, Washington 20036-
5831): USDA ERS, 1999. 
Hull, J. Options, futures, and other derivatives. 3rd ed. Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997. 
Kritzman, M. "What Practitioners Need to Know About 
Lognormality." Financial Analysts Journal, no. July-
August(1992): 10-12. 
Meyer, J. "Two-Moment Decision Models and Expected Utility 
Maximization." The American Economic Review (1987): 421-
430. Risk Balancing Strategies for Florida Dairies  25 
Modigliani, F., and M. H. Miller. "Corporate Income Taxes and the 
Cost of Capital :  A Correction." American Economic Review 
53(1963): 433-443. 
Modigliani, F., and M. H. Miller. "The Cost of Capital, Corporation 
Finance and the Theory of Investment." American Economic 
Review 48(1958): 261-297. 
Plug, G. "Some Remarks on the Value at Risk and the Conditional 
Value at Risk." Probabilistic Constrained Optimization:  
Methodology and Applications (2000): PP 272-281. 
Rockafellar, R. T., and S. Uryasev. "Optimization of Conditional 
Value at Risk." Risk 2, no. 3(2000): pp21-41. 
Turvey, C. G., and G. Nayak. "The Semi Variance-Minimizing 
Hedge Ratio." Western Agricultural Economics Journal 21, 
no. 1(2003): 100-115. 
Tyrell, R. R., and S. Uryasev. "Conditional Value at Risk for 
General Loss Distributions." Journal of Banking and Finance 
26(2002): pp1443-1471. 
Uryasev, S. "Conditional Value-at-Risk: Optimization Algorithms 
and Applications." Financial Engineering News (2000). 
Warner, J. "Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence." The Journal of 
Finance 32, no. 2(1977): 337-347. 
Yoshiba, T. "Comparitive Analyses of Expected Shortfall and 
Value at Risk." www.gloriamundi.com (2001). 
 